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A.

Nature of the Case

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Idaho Legislature has empowered the
Industriai Commission ("Commission") to award as worker's compensation benefits Claimant
Josue Barrios ("Barrios") costs and fees related to the services provided by a guardian ad litem, a
guardian, and a conservator. The Commission held Idaho Code§ 72-432(1) authorized the
award of such costs and fees. Appellants Zing, LLC and the State Insurance Fund (the "Fund")
(collectively "Employer") seek a reversal of that award.

B.

Course of Proceedings

Barrios filed a Worker's Compensation Complaint with the Commission on September
14, 2015. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-506, the Commission assigned the above-entitled matter
to Referee Douglas A. Donohue, who conducted a hearing in Boise on March 31, 2016. The
case came under advisement on July 11, 2016. The Commission substituted its own decision for
that proposed by the Referee and entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
("Order") on August 30, 2016. Employer timely filed a Notice of Appeal on October 6, 2016.

C.

Statement of the Facts
1.

Barrios Is Totally and Permanently Disabled

Barrios suffered a profound injury as a result of an industrial accident. Barrios's claim
for benefits was accepted by the Fund and all medical expenses have been paid by the fund and
are paid on an ongoing basis. See Reporter's Transcript, March 31, 2016 ("Tr."), pp. 142-144
(testimony of Donna Young); see also Agency Record ("AR"), Defendants' Ex. 20 (Paid Cost

1

of the date of the hearing before the Commission, the Fund paid Barrios $1,413.68 per month
in permanent total disability payments. Id.

In addition to the claims examiner, the Fund assigned a nurse, Debbie Welch, to Barrios's
case and monitored the medical services he was provided immediately after the accident. Tr.,
pp. 148-149. Following the accident, the Fund provided medical care to Barrios through St.
Alphonsus and then Southwest Idaho Advanced Care, an acute care facility where Barrios was
treated until he reached the level where he could participate in rehabilitation therapies. Id. After
Barrios progressed to the point where he was able to leave Southwest Idaho Advanced Care, he
returned to St. Alphonsus for approximately one month to continue his recovery; then he was
transferred to Ashley Manor, an assisted living facility. Id. at 150-151. During this time, the
Fund provided rehabilitation services through the STARS program and continued to pay all of
Barrios's medical expenses. Id.; see also AR, Defendants' Ex. 20.

2.

Employer Provides and Will Continue to Provide a Constant
Attendant to Barrios as a Medical Service

At the time of the hearing, Barrios resided with Isobel Hernandez, who operates a
certified family home. Tr., p. 113, 11. 3-19. Barrios moved from Ashley Manor to Hernandez's
home because Hernandez, like Barrios, speaks Spanish. See generally Tr., p. 116, 11. 7-19.
According to Hernandez, Barrios would be "lost" if he did not live in a Spanish speaking home.

1 References

to the Exhibits to the Agency Record will not reference page numbers as the
Agency Record provided to the parties did not contain copies of the exhibits or list page numbers
for the exhibits.

2

up, bathing, eating, picking out his clothes, and monitoring him on a daily basis. See generally
Tr. pp. 114-121. Employer pays the costs for the attendant care provided by Hernandez. Id., p.
142, I. 17 -p. 147, L 22 (testimony from Fund representative Donna Young that Barrios is being
paid benefits on a total and permanent disability basis with additional payments of $3,200 per
month (currently) by the Fund to cover the costs of Barrios's living arrangements and the
services provided by Hernandez); see also AR, Defendants' Ex. 17 (copy of admission
agreement for Barrios's admission to Hernandez's certified family home); AR, Defendants' Ex.
20 (cost summary showing payments to Hernandez).

3.

The Ada County Magistrate Appointed the Guardian and the
Conservator

On October 30, 2014, Ada County Magistrate Judge Bieter appointed Tresco ofldaho as
the Conservator for Barrios and Castle Rock as the Guardian for Barrios, pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 15-5-304 and Idaho Code§ 15-5-408. AR, Claimant's Exhibit C.

4.

The Guardian Ad Litem, Guardian, and Conservator Do Not Provide
Medical Services

Barrios's guardian ad litem, Mr. Robert Aldridge, testified that he has no license to
provide any medical treatment or services and does not provide Barrios any hands-on medical
care or services. Tr., pp. 33-36. The guardian ad litem also testified that he does not provide
services to Barrios on a constant basis, does not live with him, does not see Barrios on a daily
basis, and had not seen him in several months as of the date of the hearing in this matter. Id., p.
36.

3

guardian) testified that the court appointed guardian does not provide any medical services or
treatment. Tr., pp. 72-74. Mayes testified that he does not see Barrios on a daily basis and only
sees him once or twice a month. Id., pp. 73-74. Castle Rock Services does not help Barrios with
his daily activities, such as taking care of himself and cleaning his room and bathroom. Id., p.
77. The guardian does not provide any medical services to Barrios. Id., pp. 80-81.
Barrios's conservator (Paul Seideman, Barrios's assigned representative at Tresco of
Idaho, the appointed conservator) testified that Tresca of Idaho does not provide any medical
services or treatment to Barrios or assist him with any daily activities. Tr., pp. 97- 99.

II.

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether the Industrial Commission erred in holding the services provided to Barrios by a
guardian ad litem, conservator, and guardian were compensable worker's compensation benefits
under Idaho Code§ 72-432(1).

III.

STANDARDOFREVIEW

The facts pertinent to this appeal from the Industrial Commission are not in dispute, only
the legal conclusions drawn from those facts; therefore, the Court exercises free review. See,

e.g., Maravilla v. J.R. Simplot Co.,_ P. 3d _, 2016 WL 7488385, at *2 (Idaho Dec. 30, 2016)
(citing Kelly v. Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc., 159 Idaho 324, 326, 360 P.3d 333, 335 (2015)).
An interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which the Court exercises free review.

State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, 130 Idaho 727, 732, 947 P.2d 400,405 (1997).

4

ARGUMENT
A.

Pertinent Legal Principles of Statutory Construction

Where the statutory language is unambiguous, "this Court does not construe it, but
simply follows the law as written." McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810,
813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006). The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to
legislative intent. Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 160 Idaho 223, 226, 370 P.3d 738, 741 (2016)
(concerning statutory interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-431 ); see also Robison v. Bateman-Hall,
139 Idaho 207,210, 76 P.3d 951,954 (2003). Because "the best guide to legislative intent is the
words of the statute itself," the interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the
statute. In re Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819,824, 828 P.2d 848,853 (1992).
Importantly, parties' differing interpretations do not operate as a de facto finding of
ambiguity. See State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,476, 163 P.3d 1183, 1188 (2007). In Canty v.

Idaho State Tax Commission, the Idaho Supreme Court established that a statute is ambiguous
when:
[T]he meaning is so doubtful or obscure that "reasonable minds
might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning." Hickman v.
Lunden, 78 Idaho 191,195,300 P.2d 818,819 (1956). "However,
ambiguity is not established merely because different possible
interpretations are presented to a court. If this were the case then
all statutes that are the subject of litigation could be considered
ambiguous .... [A] statute is not ambiguous merely because an
astute mind can devise more than one interpretation of it." Rim
View Trout Co. v. Higginson, 121 Idaho 819,823, 828 P.2d 848,
852 (1992).

Canty, 138 Idaho 178, 182, 59 P.3d 983, 987 (2002) (quoting State v. Browning, 123 Idaho 748,

5

meaning is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense. Nagel v. Hammond, 90
Idaho 96,408 P.2d 468 (1965); John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 68 Idaho 185,
191 P.2d 359 (1948).
"[I]t is a well-recognized rule of statutory construction that general terms and
expressions of a statute are to be given a general construction unless some other provision of the
statute or the context itself shows that the Legislature intended them to be used and applied in
a limited or restricted sense." Robinson v. Huffaker, 23 Idaho 173, 189, 129 P. 334, 339-340
(1912) (emphasis added); see also Baca v. State, 119 Idaho 782,810 P.2d 720 (1991) (" ... [i]n
ascertaining this intent, not only must the literal wording of the statute be examined, but also
account must be taken of other matters, such as the context .... ") (citation and internal quotation
omitted). "In determining legislative intent, [Idaho courts] apply the doctrine of ejusdem
generis, which states that where specific words of description are followed by general terms, the
latter will be regarded as referring to persons or things of a like class of those particularly
described." Washington Water Power Co. v. Kootenai Envtl. All., 99 Idaho 875, 881, 591 P.2d
122, 128 (1979).
When interpreting a statute, courts are advised to avoid interpretations that could lead to
absurd results. See, e.g., Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307,312, 109
P.3d 161, 166 (2005).
Nevertheless, the worker's compensation law is to be liberally construed in favor of the
claimant in order to effect the object of the law and to promote justice. Haldiman v. American

6

serve leave no room for a narrow technical construction. Id. "The lodestar ofliberal
construction of the Workmen's Compensation Law [requires] if possible, the rehabilitation of
injured employees and correct treatment of them." Irvine v. Perry, 78 Idaho 132, 139, 299 P.2d
97, 101 (1956). However, the Commission may not read into a statute a provision that is not
found in the statute. See Tway v. Williams, 81 Idaho l, 8,336 P.2d 115, 119 (1959) (courts and
administrative agencies interpreting statutes "are not permitted to read into a statute a provision
not found therein.").

B.

Idaho Code§ 72-432(1) Does Not Authorize the Commission to Order
Employer to Pay Any Costs or Fees Related to the Guardian Ad Litem, the
Guardian, or the Conservator
1.

Idaho Code § 72-432(1) Applies Only to Reimbursable Medical
Services

The first step in statutory interpretation is determining whether or not the statutory
language is ambiguous. If the language is not ambiguous, the Court should apply the terms of
the statute as ·written. The language at issue in Idaho Code§ 72-432(1) is unambiguous. It lists
compensable medical services and devices and other healthcare related services. It makes no
reference to services provided by a guardian ad litem, guardian, or conservator.
The first sentence ofldaho Code § 72-432(1) is the language at issue in this case.
Subject to the provisions of section 72-706, Idaho Code,
the employer shall provide for an injured employee such
reasonable medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment,
nurse and hospital services, medicines, crutches and apparatus, as
may be reasonably required by the employee's physician or needed

7
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disease, and for a reasonable time thereafter.
Idaho Code§ 72-432(1). 2 According to this Court, "[t]he first sentence of the subsection states
in broad terms the medical care that an employer is required to provide to an injured employee."
Reese v. V-1 Oil Co., 141 Idaho 630, 633, 112 P.3d 721, 725 (2005) (emphasis added). The

Commission erred in holding that § 72-432(1) requires an employer to compensate an injured
worker for non-medical or non-healthcare related services. The guardian ad litem, guardian, and
conservator each testified they do not provide medical care.

2.

The Commission Erred in Interpreting "Other Attendance" To
Include Non-Medical or Non-Healthcare Related Services

The Commission erroneously concluded the term "other attendance" found in§ 72432(1) authorized the Commission to order an employer to reimburse an injured employee for
costs and fees incurred by the employee for a person to "make day to day decisions" for the
injured worker or to "manage his financial affairs". AR, pp. 31-32. The Commission examined
the definition of "attendance" and noted the dictionary defined attendance as the act of attending.
Id. The Commission reasoned that the "attendance that employer is required to provide is

medical, surgical and 'other', i.e. other than medical." Id. at p. 31. The Commission determined
the modification of attendance with "other" was meant by the Legislature to authorize the
Commission to award non-medical benefits for attending services. The Commission noted that
"[i]t does not seem unreasonable to require Employer to provide [a guardian, guardian ad litem,

2

The provisions ofldaho Code § 72-706 are not relevant to this appeal.

8

unreasonable to make an employer pay for these non-medical services is irrelevant to whether
the Legislature authorized the Commission to award such benefits. The Commission failed to
properly analyze the statutory language in context to determine the legislative intent and
erroneously focused on what it considered to be a reasonable outcome.
The Commission cited to selected dictionary definitions of attendance, ignored several
definitions of"attending" in its selected sources3 , and ignored the context of the first sentence of
§ 72-432(1). Rather than examine the term "other attendance" in context (in a statute concerning
the provision of medical services and reimbursement for such services and embedded in a list of
specific types of medical services), the Commission ignored the context of the statutory scheme
ofldaho Code§ 72-432 and the definition of medical services in Idaho Code§ 72-101(21).
Because "other attendance" is placed in the midst of a list of clearly medical and healthcare
related services, the Legislature obviously intended the term "attendance" to mean a provision of
healthcare services attending to his or her patient or client. See Robinson, 23 Idaho at 189, 129
P. at 339-340 (holding context of term in statute can demonstrate Legislature intended term be
understood in a limited or restricted sense).
The term "attending" or "to attend" has been traditionally used, when the subject matter
concerns an injured person, to mean the provision of healthcare related services. See, e.g., Hayes

The Commission ignored the definition of ''to attend" as care provided by a physician.
See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/attend (last visited January 13, 2017) (defining
to attend as "to visit professionally especially as a physician <a doctor attending his patients>".
3

9

at
plaintiff failed to establish the, "requisite element that Kessler [a medical provider] acted with
deliberate indifference in failing to attend to Hayes' medical condition") (emphasis added); Paul

v. Bd. ofProfl Discipline of Idaho State Bd. ofMed., 134 Idaho 83 8, 841, 11 P .3d 34, 3 7 (2000)
("Dr. Paul was on vacation during the time in question, and other neurosurgeons were on call to
attend to patient D.G.") (emphasis added); Blackburn v. Olson, 69 Idaho 428,433,207 P.2d
1160, 1163 (1949) ("It appeared that the foreman of the employer requested a physician to attend
claimant stating that she was covered by insurance .... ") (emphasis added). The prior enactment
ofldaho Code§ 72-432, the now repealed Idaho Code§ 72-307, had the heading "Medical
Attendance". See Steinebach v. Hoff Lumber Co., 98 Idaho 428,430,566 P.2d 377,379 (1977)
("Medical attendance. The employer shall provide for an injured employee such reasonable
medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment ... as may be required or be requested by the
employee immediately after an injury, and for a reasonable time thereafter.") (citing Idaho Code
§ 72-307 prior to 1972 amendment).
"[W]hen the legislature borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition
and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that
were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the
meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case,
absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not
as a departure from them." State v. Oar, 129 Idaho 337, 340, 924 P.2d 599, 602 (1996) (citations
and punctuation omitted). The Legislature is presumed to know the traditional use of the word

10

term

context

that context, "to attend" means to provide medical or healthcare related services.
Further evidence of the limited meaning of other attendance is found in the definition of
medical services in § 72-10 I (21 ). That statute defined medical services to include, "medical,
surgical, dental or other attendance or treatment.. .. " See Idaho Code§ 72-101(21) (emphasis
added). This definition does not include any reference to services provided by a guardian ad
litem, guardian, or conservator. ''Legislative definitions of terms included within a statute
control and dictate the meaning of those terms as used in the statute." State v. Yzaguirre, 144
Idaho at 477, 163 P.3d at 1189. "Other attendance" is a medical service per§ 72-102(21). The
Commission erred in ignoring that statutory definition and holding the term "other attendance"
encompassed non-medical and non-healthcare related services. The guardian ad litem, guardian,
and conservator by their own admission did not provide medical services to Barrios. Therefore,
the services are not encompassed by the term "other attendance". Any guardian ad litem,
guardian, or conservator services provided to Barrios are not compensable under Idaho Code §
72-432(1).
In the context of§ 72-432(1) and in line with the statutory definition of medical services
(which includes the reference to "other attendance"), the only reasonable conclusion is that
"other attendance" is a medical or healthcare related service (such as services provided by an
attending physician, nurse, physical therapist, etc.). See, e.g., Great Northern Cas. Co. v.

McCollough, 174 N .E. 103, 105 (Ind. Ct. App. 1930) ("The primary meaning of 'medical
attendance' is the rendering of professional medical services. Bouv. LA w DICT., title Medicine.
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are
meaning to the professional attendance of a physician, but may include nursing and watching.''),
The term "attendance" in Idaho Code§ 72-432(1) cannot logically be construed to include the
non-medical services provided by the guardian ad litem, the guardian, or the conservator.

3.

The Nature of the Services Provided Determines Whether the Services
are Compensable Under§ 72-732(1)

By using the phrase "other attendance" in Idaho Code § 72-432(1 ), the Legislature
established that the employer's required provision of medical and healthcare related services
could be provided by a medical professional ("medical attendance") or by a non-professional
("other attendance")

so long as the services were medical or healthcare related. A court

decision from over 100 years ago explains well the nature of the services that are considered
"attendance".
While the words medical attendance are often used to denote the
rendering of professional medical services, we do not think that
their use in that respect is such as necessarily to exclude all other
meanings. The efforts of the physician, however skilful (sic) or
assiduous he may be, must usually be supplemented by an
attendance which he cannot give. It matters not that the persons
who give such attendance are usually donominated (sic) nurses.
Their office is to assist the physician to obtain certain medical
results.
We have no reason to suppose that the legislature used the words
medical attendance with the design that any narrow or technical
meaning should be put upon them. The statute contemplates that
there are persons who need county assistance, but who should not
be sent to the county poor-house. It provides that the township
trustees shall determine who such persons are, and supply the
necessary relief. We think that they should be allowed in all proper
cases to furnish attendants, other than professional attendants, to
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whatever else constitutes a part of the medical treatment.

Scott v. Winneshiek Cty., 3 N.W. 626,627 (Iowa 1879). Modem courts have acknowledged the
same distinction in the context of the provision of services to an injured employee. In Oil Well

Cementers, Inc. v. Thompson, 82 P.3d 125, 128 (Okla. 2003), the court held the term "other
attendance" in Oklahoma's worker's compensation statute concerning medical services to be
provided by an employer to an injured employee (which contained the same language as Idaho's
statute)4, covers services that, if provided by a professional, would be considered medical
treatment. The nature of the services provided (the "attendance") was the important fact to
examine, not whether the provider had a professional license (hence the obligation to reimburse
"other attendance", which would be attendance (medical or healthcare services) provided by a
non-licensed non-professional healthcare provider). Id.
In the instant case, the nature of the services provided by the guardian ad litem, the
guardian, and the conservator are not healthcare related services and are not "other attendance"
as the Idaho Legislature intended that term be understood.

4

See Oil Well Cementers, Inc., 82 P.3d at 128 ("At the time of Claimant's injury (and

now),§ 14(A) of title 85 held (and holds) an employer liable for its worker's reasonable
'medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital service, medicine,
crutches, and apparatus as may be necessary after the injury.'") (emphasis added). Okla. Stat.
Ann tit. 85(a), § 14 was repealed in 2011 and replaced with Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85A, § 50
(West).

13

Commission Erroneously Found
Idaho
Code§ 72-432(1) Completely Removes the Term "Attendance" From
Its Statutory Context
ln interpreting a statute, the Court is required to give effect to every word, clause and
sentence of a statute, where possible. See Norton v. Dep't of Emp't, 94 Idaho 924, 928, 500 P.2d
825, 829 (1972) (" [A] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so
that no part thereof will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one
section will not destroy another."); see also Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 30, 382 P.2d 913,
915 (1963); State v. Alkire, 79 Idaho 334,338,317 P.2d 341,344 (1957). The Commission
failed to employ this directive and concluded use of the term "other" was intended by the
Legislature to signal that "other attendance" must mean that the attendance is non-medical. See
Order, p. 9 ("The attendance that employer is required to provide is medical, surgical and 'other',
i.e., other than medical.").
The Commission ignored the contextual placement of the term "other attendance", with
respect to both the list of services in the first sentence of subsection 72-432(1) and the context of
72-432 as a whole within the Worker's Compensation Act.
When interpreting a statute, the statute is to be construed as
a whole without separating one provision from another. Burnight,
132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. Although this rule is generally
applied in terms of interpreting an ambiguous statute, the logic
behind it applies with equal force to situations where a statute is
not ambiguous. Indeed, the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of
a statutory provision cannot be properly determined from its literal
words by focusing on a tiny fraction of language while ignoring
the remainder of the statute. See id.
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McKean, 159 Idaho 75,356 P.3d 368 (2015).

The first sentence of§ 72-432(1) contains a list of specifically enumerated healthcare
related services that an employer must provide (medical attendance or treatment, surgical
attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital services, medicines, crutches and apparatus) and
general healthcare related services (other attendance or treatment). Under the doctrine of
ejudsem generis, the general phrase "other attendance" or "other treatment" must be construed as

meaning services that are like or of a similar class to the specifically enumerated services. In
other words, the term "other attendance" must be read in context and therefore refers to
attendance that is medical or health care related in nature. Examples of "other attendance" that
fall within§ 72-432(1) would be treatment or attendance by a licensed psychologist or counselor
(such professionals are not medical doctors), chiropractors, home health aides, or similar health
service providers. The term "other" does not alter the nature of the services that must be
reimbursed under Idaho Code § 72-432(1 ), but rather concerns the provider of such services.
The Commission erred in ignoring the context of"other attendance" within§ 72-432(1).
The Idaho Supreme Court has not examined the term "other attendance" but has
examined the meaning of "other treatment" and held that "treatment" is a broad term and
"employed to indicate all steps taken in order to effect a cure of an injury or disease." Burch v.
Potlach Forests, Inc., 82 Idaho 323,328,353 P. 2d 1076, 1078 (1960). 5 This holding is

5

In Burch, this Court examined the meaning of "other attendance or treatment" in Idaho

Code§ 72-307, the prior version of§ 72-432(1). While the words of the statutes are not an exact
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term
used in Idaho Code§ 72-432(1), but like treatment must be read in context to mean the provision
of medical care or healthcare related services.
In everyday usage, treatment can mean more than just medical or surgical treatment or
health care related treatment. See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/treatment and
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/treating (last visited January 12, 2017) (defining
treatment as the act of treating someone and "treating" as to deal with in speech or writing, to
present or represent artistically, to bear oneself towards, to provide free food, drink, or
entertainment, to care for medically, or to act upon with some agent). While there are many
different definitions of "treatment" in the dictionary, in the context of 72-432(1 ), only "to care
for medically" makes sense. This Court interpreted treatment to be steps taken to effect a cure of
an injury or disease (i.e., medical treatment). Burch, 82 Idaho at 328, 353 P. 2d at 1078. It
would be illogical to find that "other treatment" relates to how an employer speaks or writes
about or artistically renders an employee.
Mindful of the need to give meaning to each word in a statute, the "other" treatment (i.e.,
other than medical or surgical), in context, could refer to dental treatment or other health care
related treatment - but not treating someone to a free meal or entertainment. That would make
no sense.

match, the statutes both require an employer to provide "other attendance or treatment" and also
reference medical, surgical, hospital, and nursing services.
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watching over, guarding, or tending to an injured worker, even if the services are not medically
related will cause absurd results. Under the Commission's interpretation, the employer of an
injured worker could potentially have to pay for a maid, a companion, a bodyguard, and basically
any person or service that looks after or watches over an injured worker, whether or not the
services are healthcare related (but subject to the condition that a physician find the service is
reasonably required).
An employee's ultimately unpersuasive arguments in a case from Florida exemplifies the
error in the Commission's interpretation. The Florida District Court of Appeals found that a
hairstylist who was advised by her doctor to avoid contact with chemicals and thus was required
to pay a "shampoo girl" to wash her customers' hair could not be reimbursed by the employer for
that cost. Ulmer v. Jon David Coiffures, 458 So. 2d 1218, 1218-19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
The employee argued the shampoo girl should be deemed a medical service under the Florida
statute that required an employer to pay the costs for, "remedial treatment, care, and attendance
under the direction of a qualified physician .... " Id. 1be Court found the employee's argument,
"exceeds the bounds ofliberal interpretation." Id. However, under the Commission's decision
in this case, the shampoo girl could qualify as "other attendance" and her wages would be a
compensable benefit in Idaho.
"Other attendance" must be examined in context and held to mean healthcare related
attendance (such as services provided by an attending physician, attending nurse, or constant
"attendant" as that term is used in§ 72-432(3)). The Commission should not have removed the
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context

statute.

reversed.

5.

Cases From Other Jurisdictions Interpreting Similar Statutory
Language Hold "Other Attendance" Must be Examined in Context

The interpretation of "other attendance" as used in § 72-432(1) is an issue of first
impression that has not been considered by the Commission or the Idaho Supreme Court. In
considering issues of first impression. the Court may consider the decisions of other jurisdictions
as persuasive authority. See, e.g., Wagner v. Wagner,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d. _ (2016) (noting
that in cases of first impression, the Supreme Court finds it useful to consider persuasive
authority from other jurisdictions). The appellate courts of Rhode Island and Oklahoma have
provided instructive decisions on the meaning of"other attendance" in similar worker's
compensation statutes dealing with compensable benefits.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island considered whether the "other attendance" language
could be interpreted to include household and maid services and held that such services would
not fall under the category of"other attendance" as set forth in the statute. That court
commented as follows:
An analysis of this obligation as expressed in said§ 28-33-5 6
discloses that the means designed to accomplish such relief are
medical in nature. Contrary to petitioner's urging, a liberal

"The employer shall, subject to the choice of the employee as provided in§ 28-33-8,
promptly provide for an injured employee any reasonable medical, surgical, dental, optical, or
other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital service, medicines, crutches, and apparatus for
such period as is necessary, in order to cure, rehabilitate or relieve the employee from the effects
of his injury" R.I. Code§ 28-33-5 (emphasis added).
6
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statute
not warrant
attendance or treatment' out of context and attributing to it a
meaning totally foreign to that which it has when the section is
read as a whole. It is entitled, 'Medical services provided by
employer,' and the quoted phrase on which petitioner relies is
preceded by 'such reasonable medical, surgical, dental, optical'
and followed by 'nurse and hospital service, medicines, crutches
and apparatus .... ' In such context it would be irrational to give the
phrase relied on a meaning completely at variance with the fair
intendment of the section when read in its entirety, as it must be.

Tirocchi v. US. Rubber Co., 224 A.2d 387,442 (R.I. 1966). The court went on to hold that
"other attendance" in the context of the worker's compensation statute meant a service that was
"medical in character" and that reimbursable expenses under the statute had to be "incurred in
carrying out a course of medical treatment directly or implicitly related to the employee's health
and prescribed by the employee's physician." Id.
The Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma held differently from the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island in Wilson Paving Inc. v. Abernathy, 76 P. 3d 103 (Okla. 2003). In Wilson Paving,
the court held that the services provided by a family member were compensable as "other
attendance" since the services were akin to the care that would be provided to the injured worker
by an in-home nurse. Id. at 105. The employer argued the services were not compensable since
they were not provided by a licensed health care provider. Id. The court disagreed and focused
on the nature of the services rather than the licensing status of the provider. Id. The court's
analysis as to the scope and meaning of "other attendance" is persuasive:
We decline to interpret the statute so narrowly that it would limit
"other attendance" to licensed health care providers. If a nonnurse, especially a parent or other family member, is capable and
willing to provide home nursing care then that should be

19

acc:eo1rao:1e and, our
is
statute.
"[O]ther attendance" is not defined in or limited by the statute.
This implies an understanding that the spectrum of care needed by
injured employees is probably as varied as the injuries employees
receive. As long as the care being provided is equivalent to some
type of medical or health care it should make no difference that a
parent is the care provider.

Id (emphasis added). The terms "other attendance" in Idaho Code§ 72-432(1) should be
similarly understood to encompass medical or healthcare related services (i.e., the nature of the
services) without differentiating on the identity of the provider. In this case, the guardian,
guardian ad litem, and conservator all testified they do not provide medical or healthcare related
services.
In one of the few appellate cases that has considered whether the term "other attendance"
covers the expenses of a guardian that provides financial and personal services unrelated to the
provision of health care, an Oklahoma court held the costs and fees of a guardian were not
reimbursable as "other attendance" services. }vfohn v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, 994 P.2d 99
(1999). The court was asked to hold that "other attendance" encompassed the services provided
by a guardian and denied the request in a well-reasoned discussion:
... Respondent cites 85 O.S. § 14(A)(l), which directs the employer
to provide "other attendance" as may be necessary after an injury.
Section 14 addresses the issue of medical attention. She contends
that because it provides statutory authority for hiring a professional
health care provider, it should be extended to include the fees and
expenses of a guardian who performs financial and personal
services. Employer correctly contends there is no evidence as to
the type of services King has provided. The specific subsection of
§ 14 provides:
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an
injured employee such medical, surgical or other
attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital service,
medicine, crutches, and apparatus as may be
necessary after the injury ....

1 5 Section 14 clearly provides only for medical care and
treatment. This court will not assume that the Legislature has done
a vain and useless act Rather it must interpret legislation so as to
give effect to every word and sentence. Hill v. Board ofEduc.,
1997 OK 111, 944 P.2d 930, 933, citing Globe Life and Accident
Ins. Co. v. Okla. Tax Commission, 1996 OK 39,913 P.2d 1322,
1328 and Farris v. Cannon, 1982 OK 88,649 P.2d 529,531. To
hold§ 14 provides authority for payment of guardian fees and
expenses as claimant proposes would thwart the legislative intent
which, by the clear language of the statute, deals with medical care
and treatment only.

Id. at 101. The Commission's interpretation ofldaho Code§ 72-432(1) thwarts the legislative
intent and ignores the context of the statute, which deals with the provision of medical care and
treatment. The Commission's decision should be overturned since the Commission failed to
assess the meaning of other attendance in context.

6.

Idaho Code § 72-432 as a Whole Covers Medical Services and Any
Interpretation ofldaho Code § 72-432(1) Must Take That Context
Into Consideration

Idaho Code § 72-432, as a whole, deals with medical services, how such services are
provided, and administrative requirements concerning the provision of such medical services.
First, the title of the section is "Medical Services, Appliances, and Supplies

Reports".

Under the Commission's interpretation, the title of the statute is ignored. Idaho Code§ 72-432
covers an employer's obligation to provide medical services for injured employees. If this Court
determines the term "other attendance" in Idaho Code § 72-432(1) is ambiguous, the heading of

§

statute

"[W]here the meaning of a statute is unclear, resort may be had to the statutory heading as an aid
in ascertaining legislative intent.. .." Walker v. Nationwide Fin. Corp. ofIdaho, 102 Idaho 266,
268,629 P.2d 662,664 (1981) (citing State v. Murphy, 94 Idaho 849,499 P.2d 548 (1972));

State v. Mead, 61 Idaho 449, 102 P.2d 915 (1940). The heading ofldaho Code§ 72-432 is
"Medical Services, Appliances and Supplies-Reports". The statute concerns "medical
services", which is a statutorily defmed term that does not include any language that could be
reasonably construed to include the costs of a guardianship or conservatorship or the
appointment and services provided by a guardian ad litem.
Second, subsection 72-432(5) provides that, "Any employee who seeks medical care in a
manner not provided for in this section, or as ordered by the industrial commission pursuant to
this section, shall not be entitled to reimbursement for costs of such care." (emphasis added).
Under the Commission's holding, even though an injured employee would not be free to seek
reimbursement for medical care received in a manner not prescribed under§ 72-432, the
employee could be reimbursed for "other attendance" received in a manner not prescribed under

§ 72-432. That is an inconsistent result which should be avoided.
Third, subsection 72-432(9) provides that the injured employee is entitled to
reimbursement for travel expenses in obtaining medical care under § 72-432. Under the
Commission's holding, even though a claimant may have expenses in travelling to see his or her
guardian or conservator, that travel would not be reimbursed, even though the services would be
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must
avoided.
Fourth, the statute requires that a claimant's treating physician must order that the "other
attendance" is reasonably required. See Idaho Code § 72-432(1 ). The fact the Legislature
requires that a treating physician determine that the services are reasonably required means that
the services must be medical or healthcare related. Otherwise, the requirement that a physician
order the services makes no sense.

7.

The Commission's Decision Creates a Conflict Between Idaho Code§
72-432 and Idaho Code § 72-803

The Commission's interpretation of other attendance in§ 72-432(1) to include nonmedical services conflicts with other statutory provisions within the Worker's Compensation
Act. Since "other attendance" is included within the definition of medical services in Idaho
Code § 72-102(21 ), the Commission is empowered to approve the costs and fees charged by the
providers of other attendance services (again, since other attendance services are statutorily
defined as medical services). See Idaho Code§ 72-803 (empowering Commission to approve
claims for "medical services" provided to an injured worker). It would not be logical to
conclude the Legislature intended that Idaho Code§ 72-432(1) authorized awarding costs and
fees for medical and non-medical services under Idaho Code§ 72-432(1), but only granted the
Commission's oversight over the amounts charged for medical services under Idaho Code § 72803. Once again, the only logical conclusion is that Idaho Code§ 72-432(1) concerns the
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should be reversed.

8.

Idaho Code § 72-432(3) Defines "Attendant" Care as a Medical
Service

Idaho Code§ 72-432(3) authorizes the Commission to require an employer to pay, in
addition to income benefits, the costs of the constant service of an attendant, "as a medical
service ... when the constant service of an attendant is necessary ... by reason of other disability
resulting from the injury or disease actually rendering him so helpless as to require constant
attendance." The statute requires that a claimant seeking payment for a constant attendant be so
helpless as to require "constant attendance", which as discussed above means attendance that is
medical in nature. In§ 72-432(3), the attendance provided by an attendant is characterized as a
medical service. The definition of attendance under subsection 72-432(3) cannot be different
than "attendance" under subsection 72-432(1). The Commission's interpretation of "other
attendance" creates an internal conflict between subsections (1) and (3) of§ 72-432 and thus
should be reversed. The same terms or words used in a statute should be given the same
meaning throughout the statute.

9.

Appointment and Compensation of a Guardian (Including a
Guardian Ad Litem) and a Conservator Are Governed by the Idaho
Probate Code

The Magistrate Court for the 4th Judicial District for the State of Idaho, the court that
appointed the guardian and the conservator, has exclusive jurisdiction over the guardianship and
the conservatorship. See Idaho Code§ 15-13-205 ("Except as otherwise provided in section 15-
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with this chapter has exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the proceeding until it is
terminated by the court or the appointment or order expires by its own terms.") (emphasis
added); see also Idaho Code§ 15-5-402 (court that appointed conservator has exclusive
jurisdiction over management of the need for a conservator and protection of the estate).
The Magistrate Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to order a party to those proceedings
to pay the costs of the appointment and services of the guardian.
If not otherwise compensated for services rendered or
expenses incurred, any visitor, guardian ad litem, physician,
guardian, or temporary guardian appointed in a protective
proceeding is entitled to reasonable compensation from the estate
for services rendered and expenses incurred in such status,
including for services rendered and expenses incurred prior to the
actual appointment of said guardian or temporary guardian which
were reasonably related to the proceedings. If any person brings or
defends any guardianship proceeding in good faith, whether
successful or not, he or she is entitled to receive from the estate
his or her necessary expenses and disbursements including
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in such proceeding. If the estate
is inadequate to bear any of the reasonable compensation, fees,
and/or costs referenced in this section, the court may apportion the
reasonable compensation, fees, and/or costs to any party, or among
the parties, as the court deems reasonable.

Idaho Code § 15-5-314. 7 The Magistrate Court, and not the Commission, has the exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether or not to order a party to the appointment proceedings to pay

7

Idaho Code§ 15-5-414 contains similar language regarding the compensation payable
to conservators.
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conservator.
Absent express statutory authorization, the Commission has no jurisdiction over the
guardianship or conservatorship, including issuing an order requiring Employer to pay the costs
or fees associated with the appointment or services provided by the guardians or the conservator.
There is no such statutory authorization granted to the Commission. In fact, the authorization
lies with the probate courts. The Commission's legal conclusions in this matter have created a
conflict between Idaho Code § 72-803 and § 15-5-314. The Commission cannot have oversight
over the costs charged by the guardian, guardian ad litem, and conservator under§ 72-803, since
§ 15-5-314 grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Magistrate Court to determine the reasonableness
of such costs and charges. That conflict is easily avoided by holding reimbursable benefits under
Idaho Code § 72-432(1) do not include costs and fees for a guardian ad litem, guardian, or
conservator.

10.

Only the Legislature Can Expand the Scope of Compensable Benefits
Under the Worker's Compensation Act

"As a creature oflegislative invention, the [Industrial] Commission may only act
pursuant to an enumerated power, whether it be directly statutory or based upon rules and
regulations properly issued by the Commission under LC. § 72-508." Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho
686, 691, 864 P.2d i32, i37 (1993). Idaho's Worker's Compensation Act does not provide the
Commission with the power to award costs and fees for the services provided by a guardian ad
litem, guardian, or conservator. The Commission erroneously held that Idaho Code§ 72-432(1)
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costs
ad litem, guardian, and conservator as compensable benefits.
Whether or not the Worker's Compensation Act should, from a public policy standpoint,
require an employer and its surety to pay the costs for a guardian or conservator may not be
considered when interpreting the statute. "If the statute as written is socially or otherwise
unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial." In re Estate ofMiller, 143 Idaho
565, 567, 149 P.3d 840, 842 (2006). In the absence of a delegation of authority from the Idaho
Legislature, the Commission cannot order Employer to reimburse Barrios for the guardian ad
litem, guardianship, and conservatorshlp costs and fees (including any costs incurred in
appointing them). See, e.g., Curr, 124 Idaho at 691,864 P.2d at 137 (Commission, "may only
act pursuant to an enumerated power"); Cheung v. Pena, 143 Idaho 30, 35, 137 P.3d 417,422
(2006) (holding Commission acted outside its powers when it ordered attorney to forfeit fees for
services separate from the claims before the Commission despite noting the services were
connected with the accident that caused employee's injuries).
Unlike Idaho, other states have adopted statutes that do address the reimbursement for
guardian and conservator fees. 8 Minnesota adopted a statute that provides for the appointment of
a guardian and conservator to represent the interests of an injured employee. See Bot/er v.

Wagner Greenhouses, 754 N.W.2d 665,670 (Minn. S. Ct. 2008) (discussing Minnesota's
8

The Legislature has authorized the Commission to order an employer to pay the
worker's compensation benefits owed to an insane person to that person's guardian. See Idaho
Code§ 72-226. The Legislature could have required the employer to pay the costs of the
guardian, but did not.
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of injured employees). Minnesota's worker's compensation statute explicitly covers the
appointment of a guardian or conservator by the worker's compensation court to look out for the
best interests of the injured employee. Id. Minnesota's probate code contains a statutory
mechanism to require the insurer or self-insured employer to pay the costs of the guardian,
conservator and attorney fees incurred in their appointment. See Minn. Stat. § 524.5-50l(c):
Subject to the approval of the court, the insurer or selfinsured employer shall pay the costs and guardian, conservator,
and attorney fees of the employee or dependent associated with the
appointment of a guardian or conservator and as required under
section 176.092.
In Bot/er, the court was presented with several interrelated issues. However, both parties
agreed that the worker's compensation court had the power to determine whether or not an
insurer was responsible for the payments to reimburse the costs for the appointment of a
guardian or conservator. Botler, 754 N.W.2d at 670. The parties disagreed over whether or not
the worker's compensation court could determine the reasonableness of the costs and fees and
whether the worker's compensation court could require the insurer to pay the ongoing costs and
fees of the guardian and conservator. Id. at 670-71. The first issue was easily ruled on by the
court since neither party contested the reasonableness of the costs and fees requested. Id. As to
the second issue, the court held the worker's compensation court could not require the insurer or
self-insured employer to pay for any costs or fees beyond those incurred in the appointment of
the guardian and conservator because the statute did not authorize the worker's compensation
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or conservator.

an

The court noted that:
... the Act does not provide for the payment of the costs associated
with the ongoing services of a guardian or conservator, including
an annual accounting. "When a question of statutory construction
involves a failure of expression rather than an ambiguity of
expression, courts are not free to substitute amendment for
construction and thereby supply the omissions of the legislature."
Genin v.1996 Mercury Marquis, 622 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Minn.
2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Id.
The Idaho Legislature has not authorized the Commission to order employers or their
sureties to reimburse injured employees for the costs of appointment of or services provided by
guardians or conservators, either in the Worker's Compensation Law or the Probate Code. In the
absence of any statutory authorization, the Commission may not, per the canons of statutory
construction, supply the omitted authority for the Idaho Legislature. The power to correct what
the Commission deems an oversight in the statutory scheme is a legislative power, not judicial.

See In Re Estate ofMiller, 143 Idaho at 567, 149 P.3d at 842. If the Idaho Legislature wanted to
make fees and costs incurred by employees concerning the appointment of and services provided
by guardians (including guardians ad litem) and conservators compensable, the Idaho Legislature
could have adopted a statutory scheme similar to Minnesota or another state that has adopted
such a scheme. The Idaho Legislature did not and the Commission may not, in the absence of
any statutory authority, act in a legislative capacity and exercise a power not granted to it.
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Employer ask this Court to hold the Commission lacks the statutory authority to award
costs and fees of a guardian, guardian ad litem, or conservator be paid by an employer or surety
to an injured employee and to reverse the underlying decision that Idaho Code § 72-432(i)
authorizes the Commission to award Barrios costs and fees incurred by Barrios for services
provided by a guardian ad litem, guardian, or conservator.
DATED this 7.'1 day of January, 2017.
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